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Northern Ireland: Is the Peace
Process Really Under Threat?
Irlande du Nord: un processus de paix menacé ?
Michel Savaric
 
Introduction
1 In  April  2017,  when Theresa  May called  for  a  general  election,  the  BBC interviewed
Brenda, an elderly resident from Bristol who seemed to sum up the general mood of
British people: “You’re joking. Not another one!” she exclaimed.1 The video became viral.
In Northern Ireland, this feeling of exasperation could have been even more pronounced
since this was the fourth election in just over a year. However, the impact of the Brexit
vote should not  be neglected.  Election fatigue was counter-balanced by the issues at
stake: the prospect of a ‘hard border’ between both parts of Ireland, calls for a border
poll, hopes for a united Ireland, the fear of a break-up of the United Kingdom. This could
explain why there seemed to be a renewed interest in politics, marked first by the high
turnout at the 2nd March local assembly election. This renewed interest was expressed
through the traditional sectarian divide: people voted either for the Democratic Unionist
Party or for Sinn Féin.
2 In June, the DUP attracted an unprecedented amount of media attention in Britain and
even worldwide. While the locally published Irish News revealed that “‘who are the DUP?’
was the most asked question on Google”,2 Le Monde took an interest, even translating its
acronym into French: “Le PUD, le petit parti nord-irlandais qui permet à Theresa May d’avoir
une majorité absolue”.3 For the Huffington Post, the DUP was “[un] petit parti sulfureux”.4 The
Guardian informed its readers about “Six DUP Stances You Should Know About 5”.  The
Independent,  highlighting  the  same  contentious  topics  as  The  Guardian (abortion,  gay
marriage, climate change), wondered “Why is the DUP so controversial?6” The Telegraph
went as far as presenting each of the ten newly elected (or re-elected) DUP Members of
Parliament,  emphasizing  their  support  for  the  death  penalty,  creationism  and  their
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opposition to abortion rights.7 The Daily Mail voiced its concerns over “whether Mrs May
should be striking a deal with a party whose former leaders flirted with loyalist paramilitaries”.8
 
Nothing new about the DUP
3 For people in Northern Ireland, the fact that the British and international press suddenly
discovered the party which had been in power for ten years seemed strange. It all but
confirmed their position as the most peripheral part of the United Kingdom. There is
indeed nothing new about the Democratic Unionist Party. Historically, this party cannot
be  separated  from the  personality  of  Ian  Paisley  who  founded  it  in  1971  when  the
Troubles were still in their infancy. Paisley himself had one of the longest careers among
European politicians.  He gained notoriety during the 1964 general  election campaign
when he led a march, which turned into a riot, to have an Irish tricolour removed from
the window of an independent republican candidate office in West Belfast (Sinn Féin was
banned at the time). When Terence O’Neill, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister of the
time who was deemed too liberal and lenient towards Catholics, invited Taoiseach Sean
Lemass, a former IRA veteran, in January 1965, Paisley threw snowballs at his car. Then of
course he played a prominent role leading counter-demonstrations during the civil rights
campaign. At the time, in the 1960s, this fire-brand preacher with a booming voice who
equated anarchism, communism, republicanism with Catholicism did seem like an oddity.
4 But  over  the  years,  Paisley  became  a  permanent  fixture of  Northern  Ireland,  an
archetypal  figure.  People  used  to  tell  “Paisley  jokes”,  references  to  him  abound  in
literature.  For example,  John Hewitt  dedicated a  poem entitled “Demagogue” to him
which contained these verses:
Compulsive preacher, large, and loud of voice
in octaves of abuse, invective, hate;
a Samson self-ordained, his strength destroys
whatever justified our canting state,
since his chief skill is to articulate
the smouldering terrors and the prejudice
that makes our heritage a dubious freight
which, now exposed, is seen for what it is.9
5 Ian Paisley has also inspired characters or appeared under his real name in many novels.
He died in 2014 at the age of 88 but his image had undergone a major change. In 2006, he
agreed to share power with Sinn Féin, formerly the political wing of the IRA, his most
reviled enemies. From troublemaker, Paisley became a peacemaker.10 He even struck up a
friendship with his Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, which earned them the
nickname ‘Chuckle Brothers’.11
6 In 1998, when the Belfast (or Good Friday) agreement was negotiated, the DUP refused to
sign it. But in 2006, they signed the Saint Andrews agreement whereby they agreed to
share power with Sinn Féin in return for them recognising the legitimacy of the police.
Ever since the (Northern) Irish question resurfaced at the end of the 1960s, finding an
internal  solution to it  had been the ultimate goal  of  successive British governments.
Initially, the 1998 Belfast agreement was designed, like all previous attempts, to work
with the middle-ground of Northern Irish politics: the ‘moderate’ unionists of the UUP
(Ulster  Unionist  Party)  and  the  ‘constitutional’12 nationalists  of  the  SDLP  (Social
Democratic and Labour Party). But from 2003 onward, support for the moderates began to
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wane.  The  DUP and Sinn Féin  became the  two dominant parties.  Several  prominent
members of the UUP defected to the DUP, including Jeffrey Donaldson who, on the night
of  8  June,  was  jubilant  (“This  is  perfect  territory  for  the  DUP  obviously  because  if  the
Conservatives are just short of an overall majority, it puts us in a very, very strong negotiating
position and it  is  one we would take up with relish” he told the BBC)13 and current First
Minister Arlene Foster. The DUP and Sinn Féin were re-elected to the devolved assembly
in 2007, 2011, 2016 and 2017. In the House of Commons, the UUP lost all of its seats in
2010, regained two in 2015, lost them again in 2017. The SDLP found itself without seats in
2017.
 
Paradoxes of the DUP-SF partnership
7 Paradoxically the institutions put  in place in 1998 only began to effectively function
under the DUP-Sinn Féin coalition. The parties seen as extremist brought stability to
Northern  Ireland.  Between  1998  and  2007,  the  Northern  Ireland  assembly  had  been
suspended several times: it first met on 1 July 1998 but only existed in shadow form until
2 December 1999. Direct rule was reintroduced from 11 February to 30 May 2000, on 10
August and 22 September 2001 for 24 hours only, then between 14 October 2002 and 7
May 2007. Certainly, Northern Ireland continued to be rocked by major controversies,
political  crises  and  scandals  after  2007  but  the  assembly  and  the  executive  worked
uninterruptedly for 10 years until Martin McGuinness’s resignation on 10 January 2017.
8 Among the many political scandals that have punctuated the last ten years, a number of
them involved the DUP, contradicting its stance as the most puritan political party in
Northern Ireland. Yet, the party retained its strident opposition to the secularisation of
society,  such as same-sex marriages or the right to abortion and even promoted the
teaching  of  creationism.  These  positions  probably  have  to  be  seen  as  the  ultimate
remnants of its uncompromising past, for it has given up on what mattered most: its
absolute refusal to negotiate anything with Catholics, with nationalists and republicans.
The DUP’s electoral successes are then paradoxical in many respects. The gradual shift of
Protestant  voters  towards  the  DUP  showed  growing  disaffection  for  the  Belfast
agreement. Yet, the DUP helped secure the Northern Ireland assembly and the power-
sharing executive. Voters should logically have spurned it but it has managed to remain
at the top of every poll since 2003. However, in 2011, turnout was low: 55.71%, which may
be  read  as  an  expression  of  defiance  at  the  DUP-Sinn  Féin  partnership  from  the
electorate. The May 2016 local assembly election showed little change but turnout was
even lower, the lowest ever since 1998: 54.91%. All  of the main parties lost votes but
nationalists’ disaffection seemed more pronounced than unionists’. Sinn Féin’s share of
the vote was down 2.9% and the SDLP lost 2.2%. The two main unionist parties retained
the  same  number  of  seats  with  54  (38  for  the  DUP and  16  for  the  UUP)  while  the
nationalists were down three seats with 28 for Sinn Féin (-1) and 12 for the SDLP (-2). Two
small parties,  further to the left of the political spectrum, made gains:  People Before
Profit, which won two seats for the first time, even topping the poll in the Belfast West
constituency, and the Green Party.
 
Table 1: Northern Ireland Assembly election (5 May 2016) overall results14
Affiliation Votes (1st pref.) Share +/−% (from 2011) Seats Gain/Loss
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DUP 202,567 29.2 −0.8 38 -
SF 166,785 24.0 −2.9 28 −1
UUP 87,302 12.6 −0.7 16 -
SDLP 83,638 12.0 −2.2 12 −2
APNI 48,447 7.0 −0.7 8 -
TUV 23,776 3.4 +0.9 1 -
Green 18,718 2.7 +1.8 2 +1
PBPA 13,761 2.0 +1.2 2 +2
UKIP 10,109 1.5 +0.8 0 -
PUP 5,955 0.9 +0.6 0 -
Conservative 2,554 0.4 +0.4 0 -
Independent 22,650 3.3 +0.9 1 -
Others 8,322 1.2  0 -
Total 694,314 100.0  108  
Source: Irish Political Studies, “Data Yearbook 2017”, Vol. 32, Issue 4, Dec. 2017, p. 529.
9 At the same time as the Stormont election campaign was taking place, political parties
were  also  preparing  for  the  EU  referendum.  On  20th February,  the  DUP  decided  to
campaign for a Leave vote. It had chosen to align itself with UKIP. It was the only major
Northern Ireland party to do so. The UUP had decided to back the Remain campaign,
along  with  the  two  main  nationalist  parties.  On  11th March,  Sinn  Féin’s  Martin
McGuinness called for a border poll if the UK voted to leave the EU.15 Such a position
could  be  seen  as  strange  since,  by  campaigning  for  a  Remain  vote,  it  was  actually
campaigning against a referendum on Irish unity. But this was the same position as the
one taken by the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP).
10 The border issue was the main focus of concern during this campaign. The checkpoints
between  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Republic  of  Ireland  used  to  be  part  of  the  most
militarised zone in Europe. With the peace process, controls were gradually suppressed so
that today, travellers move from one jurisdiction to the next without almost realising it.
The border issue is linked to the partition of Ireland, a topic which used to be hotly
debated and contested but had seemed to become less relevant in recent times. On 10th
February, Irish Ambassador to the UK Dan Mulhall was invited to address the House of
Commons’ Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. He argued that if Britain voted to leave
the EU, it would create uncertainty about the border between Northern Ireland and the
Republic.16 On 6th June, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne came to Belfast to
campaign for a Remain vote. He stated that should the UK leave the EU, border checks
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would become inevitable. Then on 9th June, former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John
Major made a joint appearance at the University of Ulster and warned that Brexit could
lead to the disintegration of the United Kingdom.
11 The vote took place on 23rd June. The gap was narrower than the 70/30 which polls had
predicted at the start, but Northern Ireland voted by 55.8% to remain in the European
Union.  We  can  try  and  analyse  voters’  behaviour  by  comparing  the  election  and
referendum results in every constituency. For Assembly elections, Northern Ireland uses
the single transferable vote system whereby voters rank candidates. This system which is
designed to achieve proportional representation enables tactical voting. In order to take
account of  the general  outlook of  each constituency (whether it  is  more unionist  or
nationalist), we need to consider the first preference votes but also the total number of
unionist, nationalist or other Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) elected.
 
Table 2: Comparison between the 5th May 2016 Assembly election and the 23rd June EU referendum
in Northern Ireland
Constituency 5 May 2016 NI Assembly election 23 June 2016 EU referendum
 Turnout
1st preference
vote
MLAs Turnout Remain Leave
Belfast East 57.23% DUP 14.8%
DUP 3
APNI 2
UUP 1
66.17% 48.6% 51.4%
Belfast North 52.48% SF 15.57%
DUP 3
SF 2
SDLP 1
57.39% 50.4% 49.6%
Belfast South 54.25% SF 14.17%
DUP 2
SF 1
APNI 1
SDLP 1
Green
1
66.88% 69.5% 30.5%
Belfast West 57.80% PBPA 22.88%
SF 4
PBPA 1
SDLP 1
48.85% 74.1% 25.9%
Lagan Valley 53.19% DUP 13.8%
DUP 3
UUP 2
APNI 1
66.25% 46.9% 53.1%
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South Down 53.80% SDLP 12.31%
SDLP 2
SF 2
DUP 1
UUP 1
62.22% 67.2% 32.8%
Mid-Ulster 58.75% SDLP 15.23%
SF 3
SDLP 1
UUP 1
DUP 1
61.56% 60.4% 39.6%
North Antrim 52.93% DUP 13.24%
DUP 3
TUV 1
UUP 1
SF 1
64.67% 37.7% 60.3%
East Antrim 51.01% DUP 18.22%
DUP 3
UUP 1
APNI 1
SF 1
64.95% 44.8% 55.2%
North Down 49.57% DUP 19.72%
DUP 3
UUP 1
Green
1
APNI 1
67.33% 52.4% 47.6%
South Antrim 51.01% DUP 14.27%
DUP 3
UUP 1
APNI 1
SF 1
63.12% 49.4% 50.6%
Strangford 50.25% UUP 14.31%
DUP 3
UUP 2
APNI 1
64.17% 44.4% 55.6%
East Londonderry 50.79% DUP 13.46%
DUP 3
Ind 1
SDLP 1
SF 1
59.69% 52.0% 48.0%
Foyle 56% SF 12.68%
SF 2
SDLP 2
PBPA 1
DUP 1
57.18% 78.2% 21.8%
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Fermanagh and South
Tyrone
64.55% DUP 18.65%
DUP 2
UUP 1
SF 2
SDLP 1
67.82% 58.6% 41.4%
West Tyrone 59.86% DUP 11.98%
SF 3
SDLP 1
DUP 1
UUP 1
61.69% 66.8% 33.2%
Upper Bann 54.44% DUP 17.49%
DUP 2
UUP 2
SF 2
63.64% 47.4% 52.6%
Newry and Armagh 59.32% SF 14.29%
SF 3
SDLP 1
DUP 1
UUP 1
63.94% 63.1% 36.9%
Source: the electoral ofﬁce for Northern Ireland17
12 It then appears that the turnout was generally higher in June than in May, Northern
Ireland voters felt more concerned by the referendum than by the Assembly election. The
Leave vote tended to be victorious in unionist-dominated constituencies but sometimes
with  a  small  majority:  50.6%  in  South  Antrim,  51.4%  in  Belfast  East.  Nationalist
constituencies tended to vote Remain in a much higher proportion than unionist ones
voted Leave. However, two exceptions need to be noticed. In May, West Belfast voters
clearly spurned Sinn Féin and gave the People Before Profit candidate the best score of all
candidates in that election (22.88% first preference). This party campaigned for leaving
the EU from a left-wing perspective. In June, the Remain vote had its second highest score
with 74.1% but the turnout was significantly down 8.95 percentage points. So it seems
that PBPA supporters chose to stay at  home rather than vote Leave along with DUP
followers. In Foyle, where a People Before Profit MLA had also been elected, a similar but
less pronounced trend could be noticed: with 78.2%, the Remain vote had its best score,
but the turnout had only marginally increased (from 56% to 57.18%).
13 Once the votes were counted, Sinn Féin responded by a call for a border poll. Its relatively
poor showing in the Assembly election the previous month and what, by contrast, had
been described as “Arlene’s triumph”18 seemed counter-balanced. But if the DUP appeared
out of touch with the unionist population, nationwide it was vindicated: “only one party
(except UKIP with 1 seat) in Westminster solidly supported what has now been shown to be the
majority will of the British people: that party is the DUP. Maybe middle England is much more akin
to the views of the DUP than many might like to think”.19
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From one snap election to the next
14 A few months later, while Arlene Foster had become First Minister, a major controversy
developed, which turned into a full-blown political crisis. By the time she took office, an
investigation was already under way into the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI). Modelled
on a similar scheme in England designed to encourage the shift to renewable energy
sources such as wood pellets, it had one major flaw: payments made exceeded the money
spent by 12%.20 So property owners were actually getting paid for heating their premises.
The scheme had been in place since 2012, when Arlene Foster was the minister for trade,
enterprise and investment. It soon became dubbed the “cash for ash” scandal when it
transpired that whistle-blowers had tried to alert Arlene Foster about frauds on several
occasions. One farmer was reported to be poised to earn £1m over a 20-year period just
for heating an empty shed. Before Christmas 2016, it was announced that the total bill of
the RHI scheme would amount to £490m, to be repaid entirely on Northern Ireland’s
budget while public services were already struggling with austerity measures imposed by
Westminster.
15 Sinn Féin’s initial reaction to the mounting criticism of Arlene Foster was surprised and
confused. The party first asked her to step aside while an investigation took place. Then, “
with  deep  regret  and  reluctance”,  Martin  McGuinness  announced  his  resignation  on  9
January, making  a  new  election  to  the  assembly  inevitable.21 He  blamed  the  First
Minister’s obstinacy, but he would have resigned in any case as he had been diagnosed
with a rare genetic disease that proved to be fatal. He was hospitalised in Derry on 6
March and died on the 21st. McGuinness was succeeded by Michelle O’Neill on 23 January.
16 The snap election to the devolved assembly was held on 2 March 2017. Coming a mere 10
months after the previous one,  a low turnout could have been expected.  Exactly the
opposite happened: at 64.8%, it was the highest since 1998. Undoubtedly, the Brexit vote
and the border issue influenced voters’ behaviour. The overall results show that Sinn Féin
mostly benefited from this increased turnout at the polls.
17 Table 3: Northern Ireland Assembly election (2nd March 2017) overall results
Affiliation Votes (1st pref.) Share +/−% (from 2016) Seats
DUP 225,413 28.1% −1.1 28
SF 224,245 27.9% +3.9 27
SDLP 95,958 11.9% −0.1 12
UUP 103,314 12.9% +0.3 10
APNI 72,717 9.1% +2.1 8
Green 18,527 2.3% −0.4 2
TUV 20,523 2.6% −0.9 1
PBPA 14,100 1.8% −0.2 1
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PUP 5,590 0.7% −0.2 0
Conservative 2,399 0.3% −0.1 0
Labour alternative 2,009 0.3% - 0
UKIP 1,579 0.2% −1.3 0
CISTA22 1,273 0.2% - 0
WP23 1,261 0.2% - 0
Independent 14,407 1.8% −1.5 1
Total 803,315 100.0  90
Source: Wikipedia24
18 During the campaign, the SDLP and the UUP had tried to work out a pact which would
have appealed to middle-ground voters.25 By so doing, they were calling to transgress the
sectarian divide. This strategy failed, prompting the immediate resignation of the UUP
leader Mike Nesbitt. In West-Belfast, the People Before Profit candidate lost his seat, even
if  his  total  number  of  first  preference  votes  had  increased  slightly.  In  an  assembly
reduced from 108 to 90 members, the DUP got 28 seats, Sinn Féin 27, the SDLP 12 and the
UUP 10. For the first time ever, with 39 to 38, nationalist parties had a majority over
unionist ones, while the DUP had one more seat than Sinn Féin. Some celebrated this
election result as the awakening of nationalism: “Nationalism has awakened from its slumber,
and in the process it  has delivered the first electoral results that are reflective of the sharply
changing  demographic  realities  of  the  northern  state”.26 It  is  debatable  whether  the
demographic realities of Northern Ireland had changed in the space of 10 months. What
happened  between  the  two  elections  was  the  unexpected  referendum  result  which
brought back to the fore old constitutional issues. Nationalists felt reinvigorated by the
Remain victory in Northern Ireland which gave a sense of credibility to talks of a united
Ireland while unionists were demoralised.
19 Then ensued a long stalemate which is still going on to this day: no executive has been
formed. As in previous periods of suspension, the Members of the Legislative Assembly
(MLAs) are still getting paid. At first, the main issues blocking the return of devolution
were not the inquiry into the RHI fiasco, nor the prospect of a hard border with the
Republic when the UK leaves the EU, but the demands set by Sinn Féin which the DUP
refused to accept: an Irish Language Act, a bill of rights and same-sex marriage.
20 On 18 April,  Theresa May took the world by surprise by announcing a  snap general
election for 8 June. Once again, the DUP and Sinn Féin were vindicated by the electorate.
Out of 18 seats, the former won 10 and the latter 7. One independent unionist was also
elected. The total share of seats between unionists and nationalists remained unchanged
but the other two parties, the UUP and the SDLP, were out of the picture. A comparison
between the two election results, three months apart, reveals that the duality nationalist
vs unionist had been reinforced after the Brexit referendum.
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Table 4: Comparison between the 2nd March 2017 Assembly election and the 8th June general
election in Northern Ireland
Constituency 2 March 2017 NI Assembly election
8  June  2017  general
election
 Turnout
1st preference
vote
MLAs Turnout MPs
Belfast East 63.02% DUP 14.88%
DUP 2
UUP 1
APNI 2
67.71% DUP 55.76%
Belfast North 61.77% SF 15.12%
SF 2
SDLP 1
DUP 2
67.56% DUP 46.23%
Belfast South 63.96% SF 17.67%
SF 1
SDLP 1
APNI 1
DUP 1
Green
1
66.31% DUP 30.42%
Belfast West 66.76% SF 17.14%
SF 4
PBPA 1
65.41% SF 66.71%
Lagan Valley 62.57% DUP 17.82%
DUP 2
UUP 1
APNI 1
SDLP 1
62.23% DUP 59.56%
South Down 66.21% SF 21.3%
SF 2
SDLP 2
DUP 1
67.49% SF 39.94%
Mid-Ulster 72.38% SF 21.19%
SF 3
SDLP 1
DUP 1
68.59% SF 54.51%
North Antrim 63.22% SF 15.8%
DUP 2
TUV 1
UUP 1
SF 1
64.21% DUP 58.85%
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East Antrim 60.12% DUP 16.03%
DUP 2
UUP 2
APNI 1
60.83% DUP 57.34%
North Down 60.12% DUP 21.28%
DUP 2
UUP 2
APNI 1
61.04% Ind. 41.21%
South Antrim 62.40% SF 16.27%
DUP 2
UUP 1
APNI 1
SF 1
63.44% DUP 38.24%
Strangford 60.94% DUP 16.04%
DUP 3
UUP 1
APNI 1
60.36% DUP 62.03%
East Londonderry 62.69% SF 13.97%
DUP 2
Ind. 1
SDLP 1
SF 1
61.57% DUP 48.07%
Foyle 65% SF 20.63%
SF 2
SDLP 2
DUP 1
65.6% SF 39.71%
Fermanagh  and  South
Tyrone
72.61% DUP 16.22%
SF 3
UUP 1
DUP 1
76.08% SF 47.17%
West Tyrone 69.89% SF 17.4%
SF 3
SDLP 1
DUP 1
68.23% SF 50.72%
Upper Bann 62.54% SF 15.94%
DUP 2
UUP 1
SDLP 1
SF 1
64.15% DUP 43.53%
Newry and Armagh 69.41% DUP 17.77%
SF 3
SDLP 1
DUP 1
68.87% SF 46.97%
Source: the electoral ofﬁce for Northern Ireland27
21 We may note the distortion effect caused by the first-past-the-post voting system which
mainly benefited the DUP. Constituencies like Belfast North and Belfast South do not have
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a unionist majority yet returned DUP MPs to Westminster. In any case, the fact that the
border had become the most talked about issue did not ease off the polarisation of the
Northern Ireland electorate. Theresa May’s difficulties became the DUP’s opportunity:
suddenly, its 10 Members of Parliament mattered. They were Kingmakers. Finding itself
catapulted from the outer fringes to the centre of British power, the Northern Irish party
saw  a  way  to  redress  its  previous  misfortunes  with  the  unplanned  RHI  scandal  in
December and its relative loss of influence on its electorate in March.
22 When Arlene Foster negotiated a £1bn deal with Theresa May,28 Sinn Féin reacted angrily.
Gerry  Adams,  who  had  taken  back  a  front-stage  role  since  the  death  of  Martin
McGuinness,  called  it  a  “blank  cheque  for  a  Tory  Brexit  which  threatens  the  Good  Friday
Agreement”.29 The threat to the peace process and/or the Good Friday Agreement, is an
argument that he has used on many occasions, for example when he was questioned by
the police in May 2014 about his alleged involvement in the 1972 murder of a widow,
mother of 10 children, accused by the IRA of being an informer.30 It seems that these
communication tools used by Sinn Féin at regular intervals were adopted unquestioningly
by the international press, for instance Le Monde:
Si  le  Royaume-Uni  choisit  de  sortir  du  marché  unique  européen  –  l’option
privilégiée jusqu’à présent par Mme May –, le rétablissement d’une frontière entre
l’Ulster  et  la  République  d’Irlande  pourrait  être  nécessaire,  afin  de  contrôler
l’immigration et le commerce. Les républicains n’apprécieraient alors pas du tout
de voir leur île à nouveau morcelée, alors que les signes visibles d’une frontière ont
aujourd’hui complètement disparu.31
23 Or L’Humanité: « En cherchant à constituer une alliance avec les extrémistes unionistes, Theresa
May risque de rouvrir les plaies de la guerre civile32. »
 
The Conservative and Unionist Party
24 But this is not the first time the Conservatives have had to make deals with unionist MPs.
On 13 June, John Major warned Theresa May that a deal with the DUP could put peace in
Northern Ireland at risk:
A fundamental part of that peace process is that the UK government needs to be
impartial between all the competing interests in Northern Ireland,” he said. “The
danger is that however much any government tries, they will not be seen to be
impartial if they are locked into a parliamentary deal, at Westminster, with one of
the Northern Ireland parties.33
25 Yet when he was Prime Minister, from 1993 on, a series of by-election defeats rendered
his political survival reliant on support from the nine Ulster Unionist MPs in Parliament.
He struck up a £10m deal with them to subsidise heavy electricity users and promised
them an electricity inter-connector cable to Scottish Power34. In his 1995 Conservative
Party Conference speech, he reminded: “We are the Conservative and Unionist Party35”.
26 The press also lambasted Theresa May for striking a deal with a party linked to loyalist
terrorism and to the bigoted Orange Order. Even if those links are not to be denied, it has
to be stressed that the supposedly middle-of-the-road UUP has had a much more ancient
and established relationship with paramilitaries and the Orange brotherhoods than the
DUP,  if  only  because  the  DUP is  more  recent.  Without  going into  the  details  of  the
creation of the UVF by Sir Edward Carson in 1912, we can point to the fact that the setting
up of the current UVF in 1965 is supposed to have taken place during a meeting at the
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UUP headquarters in Glengall Street in Belfast, organised by members of the Northern
Ireland cabinet who wanted to undermine O’Neill36. As for the Orange Order, the links
with the UUP are also very old37.
27 So, when Gerry Adams says that the DUP-Tory deal puts the Good Friday Agreement in
danger, he seems to be implying that if Sinn Féin does not get its way, the IRA will go back
on a war footing. This could be seen as a form of blackmail but perhaps efficiency matters
more than morals in politics. We may then want to ascertain the plausibility of this veiled
threat, perhaps it is pure rhetoric. In October 2015, the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI), together with the MI5, published a report on paramilitary groups at the demand
of the Northern Ireland Secretary. This report settled a serious political crisis provoked
by a series of murders. On 5 May 2015, IRA commander Gerard ‘Jock’ Davison was shot
and  killed  in  front  of  his  house  in  the  republican  Markets  area  of  Belfast.  In  the
neighbourhood, it was rumoured that the perpetrator was a former IRA member named
Kevin McGuigan. He was killed by two masked men on 12 August. A crisis developed when
the police claimed that McGuigan’s assassination had been sanctioned by the IRA at the
highest level, implying that the IRA was still in existence, a suspicion confirmed in the
report published in October. In fact, the report issued that “All of the main paramilitary
groups operating during the period of the Troubles remain[ed] in existence”.38 However, these
groups did not really represent a threat to peace as the report stated:  “It  is  our firm
assessment  that,  to  different  degrees,  the  leaderships  of  the  main  paramilitary  groups  are
committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives”.39
28 In any case, we may seriously doubt the Provisional IRA’s capacity to resume its activities,
even to the level of 1996-1997. It would take extraordinary circumstances, far beyond a
pact between the DUP and the Conservative Party. We should perhaps be warier of the
UDA, the UVF, the Red Hand Commando and the myriad of offshoots and splinter groups
who are constantly in the news, organising bonfires and parades, putting up flags on
lamp-posts, painting murals, rioting, selling drugs and carrying out punishment beatings
on  drug  dealers,  intimidating  foreigners  and  doing  voluntary  community  work,
racketeering  businesses  and  canvassing  government  officials  for  subsidies.  If  a
referendum on Irish unity were to be carried out, those loyalist paramilitary groups could
very well find their real purpose, should the results not be to their liking. However, even
if the people of Northern Ireland wanted to stay in the EU, even if nationalists have now a
majority over unionists in the temporarily out-of-order Northern Ireland Assembly, we
should not jump to conclusions regarding the result of such a referendum.
29 Since  1998,  the  Queen’s  University  of  Belfast  and Ulster  University  have carried out
surveys, called ‘Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys’, covering a wide range of issues
on a yearly basis.  On the question of what the long-term policy for Northern Ireland
should  be,  the  results  have  always  shown remarkable  consistency.40 In  2016,  54% of
respondents thought it should remain part of the UK with a devolved government, 19%
thought it should reunify with the rest of Ireland, 12% opted for remaining part of the UK
with direct rule. In 2015, the answers to the same question were 51%, 14% and 19%. In
2014, they were 50%, 17% and 16%. On a TV program shown in April 2018, academic Dr
Paul Nolan said that a catholic majority in Northern Ireland was possible by 2021.41 But a
catholic  majority does not  necessarily mean that  a majority would vote for a  united
Ireland.
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Conclusion
30 The  DUP-Conservative  deal  has  then  to  be  replaced  in  a  general  picture  of  micro-
struggles for the balance of power between the two main political parties of Northern
Ireland. In May 2016, Sinn Féin seemed in a difficult situation, having lost votes and seats
in the local assembly. Then the victory of the Remain vote locally was seen as a defeat for
the DUP. In March 2017, nationalists gained a majority over unionists at Stormont for the
first time. But in June, the DUP regained a semblance of control by offering their backing
to the Prime Minister.  These small  changes must not hide the fact  that the political
landscape of Northern Ireland if at all shows very little evolution.
31 It is a truism to say that this is a deeply divided society. Constant bickering over the
display of flags and emblems, parades, marching bands and bonfires, commemorations of
all kinds, is but a reflection of social structures dominated by socio-religious segregation.
Northern Ireland is political and cultural world of its own. Its dual educational system, its
political life, the visible signs of its conflictual past (wall murals, painted kerb-stones,
peace-lines and physical separations) do not exist anywhere else in the British Isles. Yet,
if  unionists  and  nationalists  generally  agree  that  Northern  Ireland  should  for  the
foreseeable future remain part of the UK with a devolved government, we may wonder
what really separates them. This is one first paradox.
32 The second paradox is that Northern Ireland is remarkably stable and that instability
comes from the outer world. The Brexit vote went against all the stereotypes: the English
are supposed to be pragmatic and rational, the Irish are supposed to be passionate and
disorderly. By voting for leaving the European Union, English voters have shown that
constitutional  change  is  possible,  or  is  it?  The  conundrum  of  the  border  issue  has
highlighted the fact  that  Ireland was partitioned nearly one hundred years ago.  The
question  of  Irish  reunification  has  come  back  to  haunt  British  politics,  it  attracts
attention European-wide. Nationalist expectations are then raised and unionist fears are
heightened. If Scottish nationalists get their way and achieve independence, this will also
have a strong impact on the Irish situation. In a nutshell, there is no internal threat to the
peace process in Northern Ireland but external factors have the potential to upset it.
33 Michel Savaric has been a lecturer at the University of Franche-Comté since 2002 where
he is a member of the Centre de Recherches Interdisciplinaires et Transculturelles (CRIT). He
recently collaborated to Sociétés face à la terreur,  edited by Nicolas Bonnet, Pierre-Paul
Grégorio,  Nathalie Le Bouëdec,  Alexandra Palau,  Marc Smith,  and published by Orbis
Tertius, 2017. His current research focuses on the history of Northern Ireland.
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ABSTRACTS
Following in the wake of the Brexit vote when a majority of Northern Ireland electors voted to
remain after the DUP had campaigned for leaving the EU, it really did seem that the hardline
unionist party was gradually losing its grip on local politics. The prospect of a united Ireland was
immediately seized upon by Sinn Féin as a way to solve the border issue created by the Brexit
vote. Then Theresa May unexpectedly decided to call for a snap general election on 8th June. Once
again, Sinn Féin and the DUP increased their share of the vote. But the DUP reversed its gradual
loss of influence while suddenly becoming central to British politics when it brokered a deal with
the Prime Minister. The dominant view in the British and international media was then that the
deal put the Northern Ireland peace process at risk. The point of this paper is to question this
assumption which seems to imply that simply because Sinn Féin does not get its way, the IRA will
revert back to an armed campaign. The question would rather be whether the IRA is still in a
capacity to do so. It may also be argued that the increased feeling of insecurity among the loyalist
community represents an equal threat to the stability of the region. At the same time, we will
explore all the apparent paradoxes revealed by the Northern Ireland elections since June 2016.
S’inscrivant  dans  la  foulée  du  référendum  sur  le  Brexit  où  la  majorité  des  électeurs  nord-
irlandais  avaient  voté pour rester  alors  que le  DUP avait  fait  campagne pour quitter  l’UE,  il
semblait bien que le parti unioniste extrémiste était en train de perdre de son influence sur la
politique locale. La perspective d’une Irlande unie a été immédiatement brandie par le Sinn Féin
comme solution possible au problème de la frontière posé par le vote pour le Brexit. Puis Theresa
May a décidé, à la surprise générale, de provoquer des législatives anticipées pour le 8 juin. Une
fois de plus, le Sinn Féin et le DUP ont augmenté leur score. Mais le DUP a regagné l’influence
perdue en devenant un élément central de la vie politique britannique lorsqu’il  a négocié un
accord avec la première ministre.  Le point de vue dominant dans les médias britanniques et
internationaux était alors que cet accord mettait en danger le processus de paix. Le but de cet
article sera de questionner cette assertion qui semble signifier que si le Sinn Féin n’obtient pas ce
qu’il désire, l’IRA retournera à la violence politique. La question serait plutôt de savoir si l’IRA est
toujours en capacité de reprendre les armes. On peut également avancer qu’un sentiment accru
d’insécurité parmi la communauté loyaliste représente tout autant une menace pour la stabilité
de la région. En même temps, nous explorerons tous les apparents paradoxes révélés par les
élections en Irlande du Nord depuis juin 2016.
INDEX
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